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1S2010577
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)
)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

)
)

)

V.

)
)
)
)
)
)

BRUCE McALPIN,
Defendant and Petitioner

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal From the Judgment
State of California,
The Honorable John
and

of the Superior Court of the
County of Santa Clara
A. Flaherty, Judge
Jury

Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Sixth District
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a ruling, issued on May 2, 1989 by the
Sixth District California Court of Appeal (App.Ct.No. H004154),
affirming the jury's unanimous conviction on November 23, 1987 of
appellant Mr. Bruce McAlpin (Santa Clara County Super.Ct.No. 116671),
for committing lewd and lascivious acts on a nine-year old child in
violation of California Penal Code section 288(a).
review on August 29, 1989.
rulings of the trial court.

This court granted

Appellant challenges two evidentiary
First, he contends that the trial court

committed reversible error by admitting the expert testimony of a Los
Gatos police officer, who testified that: (1) it is not uncommon for
parents to delay reporting an act of child molest to the authorities;
and (2) there is no "profile" or stereotype of a child molester.
Second, appellant contends that the trial court committed reversible
1

error by excluding the testimony of appellant’s character witnesses
that he was not a sexual deviant, and by restricting their testimony
to opinion and reputation evidence regarding his character for honesty
and veracity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Bruce McAlpin met Anita Manley, the mother of the
complaining witness, at a dance in Santa Clara, California in April or
May of 1985.

(R.T. 152.)

Ms. Manley has three children, Stephanie

(then age 9), Valerie (then age 7), and Isaac (then age 1).

On or

about June 8, 1985, the defendant and Ms, Manley went out to dinner
and dancing in Fremont.

That evening, the defendant spent the night

in his van in the driveway of Ms. Manley’s mother's house, also in
Fremont.

(R.T. 153.)

The next day, Ms. Manley, her three children,

and the defendant spent the morning at this house.

Early that

afternoon, they went to Toys-R-Us to purchase a toy for Stephanie, who
was celebrating her birthday that day.

Afterward, the defendant, Ms.

Manley, and her three children went to the defendant's house in San
Jose.

(R.T. 156.)

The group then proceeded to watch television in

the defendant’s bedroom on the defendant's bed.

Valerie laid on

defendant's left side, Stephanie laid on his right side, and Ms.
Manley sat at the foot of the bed with Isaac.

(R.T. 158-159.)

After

an unconfirmed amount of time, Ms. Manley and Isaac left the room.
Stephanie testified that the defendant initially began touching
her while her mother was still in the room.

(R.T. 202.)

According to

Stephanie, at first he only touched her on the arm, but soon
thereafter, he started moving his hand around the cuff of her shorts
and along the elastic of her underwear.

(R.T. 202.)

Stephanie stated

that whenever her mother would look in defendant's direction, he would
2

stop touching her.

(R.T. 203.)

Stephanie testified that the

defendant continued to touch her after her mother left the room.
(R.T. 207.)

She also testified that at some point the defendant put

his finger in her vagina, although she could not remember whether this
was when her mother was in or out of the room.

(R.T. 204.)

She

stated that a few minutes after her mother left, she told the
defendant that she had to go to the bathroom and went outside to see
her mother.

(R.T. 206.)

Defendant, on the other hand, denied that any lewd touching or
penetration of Stephanie's vagina had occurred.

(R.T. 333.)

He

testified that in fact, Stephanie had moved her hand toward his
genitals after Ms. Manley had left the room.

(R.T. 333.)

Defendant

claimed that he grabbed Stephanie's arm and told her not to touch him
there, and that Stephanie then got up and left the room without saying
anything.

(R.T- 334.)

Ms, Manley testified that approximately ten minutes after she had
left the room, Stephanie emerged from the house in a "little bit of a
hurry" and looked at her with an expression that she had never seen
before.

(R.T. 159.)

tears in her eyes.

She indicated that Stephanie looked sick and had
(R.T. 159.)

Ms. Manley testified that she

questioned Stephanie as to what was wrong and Stephanie responded that
the defendant had put his hand in her "private."

(R.T. 160.)

Manley then went inside to confront the defendant about this.
160.)

Ms.
(R.T.

She testified that she asked the defendant what was going on,

and that he denied anything had occurred.

(R.T. 161.)

According to

Ms. Manley, the defendant changed the subject by suggesting that they
all go out for pizza.

Ms. Manley testified that she agreed to go

because she did not know what else to do at this point.
3

(R.T. 161.)

Ms. Manley did not report the incident to the police.

(R.T. 164.)

Defendant, on the other hand, testified that after Ms. Manley
confronted him with the alleged assault, he explained to her that
Stephanie had touched his genitals.

(R.T. 317.)

The defendant then

testified that he and Ms. Manley too)c Stephanie aside and told her not
to let this happen again.

(R.T. 318.)

According to the defendant, it

was not until after this conversation that he recommended they go out
to eat.

(R.T. 335.)

Ms. Manley testified that she only dated and had sexual relations
with the defendant once after the alleged molestation.

(R.T. 180.)

Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he and Ms. Manley in fact
dated twice after the alleged incident.

(R.T. 335.)

Stephanie reported the alleged incident of child molest
approximately one year later to representatives from the Children's
Awareness Program, who had given a presentation about child abuse at
her school.

(R.T. 208.)

The Children's Awareness Program

representatives then reported the incident to the authorities.

The

authorities did not investigate the matter until approximately one
year after it was reported.

(R.T. 210.)

Bruce McAlpin was indicted

as a result of this investigation.
At the trial, the prosecution introduced the testimony of Jeffrey
Miller, an officer from the Los Gatos Police Department trained in
juvenile law enforcement.

Officer Miller testified that: (1) it is

not uncommon for a parent to delay reporting an alleged incident of
molestation perpetrated by someone the parent has been dating; and (2)
there is no "profile" or stereotype of a typical child molester, and
in fact child molesters are often people the child )cnows and trusts.
(R.T. 261-64.)

Defense counsel objected to the admission of this
4

evidence on the grounds that: (1) Officer Miller was not qualified to
testify as an expert pursuant to California Evidence Code section 801;
(2) the evidence had no probative value; and (3) even if his testimony
possessed some probative value, its probative value was outweighed by
its prejudicial effect under California Evidence Code section 352.
(R.T. 268.)

The trial court overruled these objections and admitted

the testimony on the grounds that: (1) the voir dire examination
demonstrated that Officer Miller possessed ample qualifications to
testify as an expert under Evidence Code section 801; (2) the
testimony was relevant; and (3) the probative value of the testimony
in light of the facts of the case outweighed any prejudicial effect
the evidence might have on the defendant.

(R.T. 268-69.)

During voir dire examination, defense counsel offered the
testimony of two of the defendant's former girlfriends, who would have
testified that, based on their past sexual experiences with the
defendant and the fact that they had not observed the defendant
molesting their daughters:

(1) the defendant was not a sexual deviant;

and (2) the defendant was a person of high moral character,
289.)

(R.T.

The court declined to admit this evidence on the basis that:

(1) these lay witnesses were not qualified to give their opinions on a
subject which called for expert testimony; (2) the offered testimony
related to specific instances of conduct, which, pursuant to
California Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1102, may not be offered to
prove a trait of the defendant's character and that he acted in
conformance with this character trait on a specified occasion; and (3)
the minimal probative value of the testimony was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect pursuant to California Evidence Code section 352.
(R.T. 290-94.)
5

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether, in a trial for lewd and lascivious acts upon a nine-year

old child, the trial court properly admitted a police officer's
testimony offered by the prosecution as expert opinion evidence, that:
(a) a parent's delay in reporting his or her child's statement to the
police that the child has been molested by someone the parent has been
dating is not uncommon? and (b) there is no child molester "profile,"
or stereotype.
2.

Whether, in a trial for lewd and lascivious acts upon a nine-year

old child, the trial court:

(a) properly excluded the testimony of the

defendant's previous girlfriends that his sexual behavior was not
deviant; and (b) properly restricted the witnesses* .testimony to
opinion and reputation evidence regarding the defendant's character
for honesty and veracity.
3.

Whether, assuming the trial court erred in admitting and/or

excluding testimony, the error is reversible per se, or resulted in a
miscarriage of justice under People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818 (1956).
8UKKRRY OF AR6UHENT
The trial court properly admitted the police officer's testimony
that it is not uncommon for parents of victims of child molestation to
delay reporting the incident to the police, and that there is no child
molester stereotype, for three reasons.
First, Officer Miller was qualified to testify as an expert
witness pursuant to California Evidence Code section 801.

Under

section 801, opinion testimony of expert witnesses is limited to those
subjects that are sufficiently beyond common experience such that the
expert's opinion would assist the trier of fact.

The opinion also

must be based on matter perceived or personally known to the witness
6

of a type reasonably relied on by an expert in forming an opinion on
the subject his testimony relates to.
1965).

Cal. Evid. Code § 801 (West

Here, the witness clearly met both prongs of this test.

First, the subject matter of Officer Miller's testimony was whether or
not it was common for a parent to delay reporting an incident of child
molestation to the police, and whether or not there is a stereotype
for a child molester.

These matters are not within the common

experience of the average juror.

Officer Miller's expert opinion was

therefore essential to assist the jury in evaluating Ms. Manley's (and
therefore Stephanie's) credibility, and to assist them in evaluating
the defendant's testimony free from common misconceptions regarding
child molesters.

Next, the voir dire indicated that Officer Miller's

expert opinion was based on hundreds of hours of his personal training
and experience, as well as on generally-accepted articles, books, and
case studies and conversations with other experts.

As such, his

testimony was based on matter that is reasonably relied on by an
expert when formulating an opinion.
Second, Officer Miller's testimony was properly admitted because
it was highly relevant to the case.

Expert testimony is relevant and

admissible when offered to rehabilitate or to support the credibility
of the complaining witness, and to disabuse the jury of widely held
misconceptions.

People v. Bledsoe. 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247-48 (1984);

People v. Roscoe. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1098 (1985).

Officer

Miller's expert testimony was relevant because it was offered to
rehabilitate ans support Ms. Manley's credibility, which in turn
supported Stephanie's credibility.

It also permitted the jury to

evaluate the credibility of the defendant's testimony divorced from
popular myths regarding "typical" characteristics of child molesters.
7

Third, the trial court properly admitted Officer Miller*s
testimony on the basis that the probative value of his expert
testimony in light of the facts of the case substantially outweighed
its prejudicial effect pursuant to California Evidence Code section
352.

The court's duty under this section is to balance the probative

value of the offered evidence against its potential of unfair
prejudice, undue time consumption, and creation of jury confusion.

As

discussed above. Officer Miller's testimony was highly probative on
the disputed facts of the witnesses' credibility.

On the other hand,

the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant was minimal in
comparison with the high probative value of the testimony.

Officer

Miller testified as to matters regarding child molestation cases in
general, and did not discuss the specific facts of the case.

His

testimony also was not unduly time-consuming or confusing.
The trial court also properly excluded the testimony of
defendant's former girlfriends regarding his past "normal sexual
behavior," and properly restricted their testimony to opinion and
reputation evidence regarding his character for honesty and veracity.
First, the trial court correctly concluded that lay persons are
not qualified to testify regarding the normalcy of an individual's
sexual behavior, because such testimony is within the realm of expert
testimony.

People v. Spiano. 156 Cal. App. 2d 279, 289 (1957).

A

witness may testify in this area only if he has the knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an
•icpert on the subject of what is normal or deviant human sexual
behavior.

See. Cal. Evid. Code § 720 (West 1965).

Here, the

defendant made no offer of proof of the expert qualifications of his
former girlfriends, and therefore their testimony as to the
8

defendant's prior "normal sexual behavior" was properly excluded.
Second, the character witnesses* testimony regarding the
defendant's past sexual behavior was also properly excluded on the
basis that this testimony related to specific instances of conduct.
California Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1102 clearly state that
evidence of a defendant's character or trait of his character in the
form of specific instances of conduct is not admissible if offered to
prove the defendant's conduct on a specified occasion.

Since the

defendant was offering the evidence of his past acts as proof that he
did not commit the alleged molestation, the evidence was plainly
inadmissible under these sections.
In addition, even if the specific acts testimony was being
Qffered in support of the defendant's credibility, which is
permissible, it was properly excluded on the basis that this testimony
was irrelevant to the issue of the defendant's credibility.

Evidence

of a person's past sexual behavior is collateral to the issue whether
he or she is a truthful person.

The trial court also properly

restricted the character witnesses' testimony to the specific
character traits of honesty and veracity on this basis.

The

defendant's character for honesty and veracity was the only character
trait relevant to his credibility, the only disputed fact of the case.
Evidence regarding other character traits was therefore irrelevant and
inadmissible.
Furthermore, even assuming this evidence possessed some minor
probative value, its probative value was substantially outweighed by
the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the prosecution pursuant to
California Evidence Code section 352. "Admitting evidence of the
defendant's relationships with former girlfriends would not only have
9

been very time-consuming, it also would have had the potential to
confuse and distract the jury from the facts at issue in the case.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the character witnesses* specific acts testimony, and in limiting
their testimony to opinion and reputation evidence.
Finally, assuming the trial court erred in the admission and/or
exclusion of evidence, the errors are not reversible per se, nor did
they result in a miscarriage of justice under People v, Watson. 46
Cal. 2d 818 (1956).

The errors are not reversible per se because they

did not deny the defendant his right to a fair trial.

He was still

permitted to be tried before a jury and an impartial judge, to present
evidence in support of his defense, and to cross-examine the
prosecution's witnesses.

The errors also did not result in a

miscarriage of justice requiring reversal.

It is not reasonably

probable that a more favorable result would have been reached even if
the prosecution's expert testimony were excluded, and the defendant's
proffered character evidence were admitted, because there was other
evidence in support of the jury's verdict.

Therefore, this court

should not disturb the jury's verdict assuming the trial court did err
in the admission and/or exclusion of evidence.
ARGUKENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING OFFICER MILLER'S EXPERT
TESTIMONY BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF
EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 801, IT WAS RELEVANT, AND ITS PROBATIVE
VALUE OUTWEIGHED ITS POTENTIAL PREJUDICIAL EFFECT.
Officer Miller was qualified to testify as an expert witness on

the subject of child molestation pursuant to Evidence Code section
801.

Officer Miller's testimony was also admissible because it was

highly relevant to support and rehabilitate Ms. Manley's credibility.
10

Her testimony in turn was relevant to support the complaining witness'
credibility.

The testimony was also relevant to assist the trier of

fact in evaluating the credibility of the defendant's testimony free
from the constraints of common misconceptions regarding child
molesters.

Finally, the trial court properly weighed the probative

value of the officer's testimony against its potential for unfair
prejudice pursuant to California Evidence Code section 352, and
determined that the probative value of the evidence substantially
outweighed its potential prejudicial effect.
A.

Officer Miller's Expert Testimony Was Admissible Because The
Sub1ect_0f Child Molestation Is Beyond The Common Experience
Of The Jury And The Testimony Would Assist The Jury.

Officer Miller's testimony was admissible because it satisfied
the first prong of the test for admissibility of expert opinion
testimony under Evidence Code section 801.

Section 801(a) provides

that an expert testimony in the form of an opinion is admissible if
the subject is "sufficiently beyond common experience" that the
opinion of an expert would assist the trier of the fact.
Code § 801(a)

(West 1965).

Cal. Evid.

This court has recently held that an

expert's opinion should be excluded under this section "only when it
would add nothing at all to the jury's common fund of information."
People v. Stoll. 49 Cal. 3d 1136, 1154 (1989)

(Emphasis in original).

Several California courts have held that testimony on the issue
of child molestation is sufficiently beyond common experience to be
admissible as expert testimony.

People v. Stark. 213 Cal. App. 3d

107, 110 (1989); People v. Dunnahoo. 152 Cal. App. 3d 575, 577 (1984).
In People v. Stark, the court held that a psychologist's expert
testimony regarding "child abuse accommodation syndrome" was properly
admitted and relevant to explain why victims of sexual assault often
11

delay in reporting incidents of abuse.
110.

StarX, 213 Cal. App. 3d at

Similarly, in People v. Dunnahoo, two police officers were

permitted to testify as expert witnesses that, based on their training
and experience, sexually molested children usually find it very
difficult to talk about their sexual experiences with an adult.
Dunnahoo. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 577.

The court stated that the

officers' testimony was admissible as expert opinion testimony because
child molestation is a subject sufficiently beyond common experience
that the opinion of an expert would assist the jury.
The present case is analogous to Stark and Dunnahoo.

As in those

cases, Officer Miller was called by the prosecution to give expert
opinion testimony, based on his training and experience, on the
subject of child molestation.

In Stark and Dunnahoo, the officers

testified that it is not unusual for the victims of child molestation
to delay reporting an incident of child molest and to be reluctant to
talk about their sexual experiences.

Similarly, Officer Miller

testified that it is not unusual for parents of victims of child
molestation to delay reporting the incident to the police.

The

sensitivities of victims and the sensitivities of their parents are
closely connected: a sexually molested child finds it difficult to
talk about the molestation with an adult, just as a parent of such a
child finds it difficult to talk about the molestation with the
authorities.

Officer Miller testified that there are a number of

reasons why parents might delay reporting an incident of child molest,
such as feeling shameful, fear of the relationship breaking up, or
fear of causing a family conflict.

Such knowledge is beyond the

common experience of the average juror.

Because of this. Officer

Miller's expert opinion was essential to assist the jury in evaluating
12

the credibility of Ms. Manley's testimony, which in turn was crucial
to assist them in evaluating the credibility of Stephanie's testimony.
Officer Miller's testimony therefore satisfied the requirements of
Evidence Code section 801(a).
Officer Miller's testimony that there is no stereotype for a
child molester was also admissible under Evidence Code section eoi(a).
This evidence was offered to dispel common misconceptions the average
juror may hold regarding "typical” characteristics of child molesters.
His testimony therefore by definition was related to a subject beyond
common experience.
Officer Miller's testimony is analogous to that offered in People
v. Bledsoe. 36 Cal. 3d 235 (1984).

In Bledsoe. a rape counselor was

called by the prosecution to testify as an expert witness that, in her
opinion, the victim was suffering from "rape trauma syndrome."
243-44.

Id. at

The court held that her expert testimony was admissible to

disabuse the jury of widely held misconceptions about rape and rape
victims, so that the jury could evaluate the evidence "free of the
constraints of popular myths."

Id.

Similarly, in People v. Bow)cer.

203 Cal. App. 3d 385 (1988), the court held that an expert
psychologist's testimony was admissible to dispel common
misconceptions of the jury regarding sexually abused children's
reaction to the abuse, provided that the expert testimony was narrowly
tailored to the purpose it was admissible for, and the prosecution
identified the myth or misconception the testimony was designed to
rebut.

Bowker, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 394.

Just as there are common misconceptions about victims of rape and
child abuse, there are also misconceptions about the perpetrators of
such crimes.

Officer Miller testified during the voir dire
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examination that most people think of child molesters as strangers who
use physical force.

However, he testified that, contrary to this

common belief, statistics show that only ten and one half percent of
all molestations are actually perpetrated by strangers, and that most
child molesters do not use physical force, but rather use seduction
methods.

Officer Miller's testimony was narrowly tailored to disabuse

the jury of these common misconceptions, thus enabling them to
evaluate the defendant's testimony free from such illusions.

The

prosecution also indicated that the officer's testimony was offered
for this purpose.

Therefore, because his testimony was beyond the

jury's common experience and was of assistance to the jury, it
satisfied the requirements for admissibility under Evidence Code
section 801(a).
«

officer Miller's Testimony Was Admissible Because Jt
pacied On Matter Upon Which Experts Mav Reasonably Fejy.

Officer Miller's testimony was admissible because it also
satisfied the second prong of the test for admissibility of expert
opinion testimony pursuant to Evidence Code section 801.

Section

801(b) provides that opinion testimony of an expert witness must be:
based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill,
evoerience, training, and education) perceived by or
oersonally known to the witness..-that is of type that
reasonably may be relied on by an expert in forming an
opinion on the subject to which his testimony relates...
Cal. Evid. Code § 801(b)

(West 1965).

Officer Miller's testimony that it is not unusual for parents to
delay reporting an incident of child molest and that there is no child
molester stereotype was based on his extensive personal knowledge,
experience, and training, on his study of generally-accepted books,
articles, and case studies, and on his conversations with other

14

experts.

*The

lengthy voir dire revealed that Officer Miller had four

years of experience as an investigative officer for the Juvenile
Services Bureau of the Los Gatos Police Department.

During this time,

he had between 350 and 400 hours of specialized training dealing with
juveniles, juvenile law, and child abuse.

He had also taken a forty-

hour juvenile law enforcement training course, and had personally
handled over 100 child abuse cases.

Officer Miller also had

previously been qualified as an expert in California Superior Court on
the subject of sexual and physical abuse.

Finally, Officer Miller had

studied numerous books, articles, and case studies that were accepted
and used by other experts involved in the field of child molestation,
and regularly consulted with other experts in the field.

These facts

amply demonstrate that Officer Miller's testimony was based on matter
perceived or personally known to him of a type on which experts may
reasonably rely.

Furthermore, the sufficiency of the showing of a

witness' qualifications to testify as an expert is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court.

A trial court's ruling must not

be disturbed unless manifest abuse of discretion is shown,
Kelly. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 39 (1976).

people v.

As demonstrated by Officer Miller's

substantial qualifications as an expert, no abuse of discretion was
shown here.
C,

Officer Miller’s Testimony Was Admissible Because It Was
Relevant And Its Probative Value Outweighed Its Potentj.al
Prejudicial Effect.

Officer Miller's testimony was also properly admitted because it
was highly relevant to the case.

"Relevant evidence" is defined by

California Evidence Code section 210 as "evidence, including evidence
relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is
15

of consequence to the determination of the action.”
210 (West 1965).

Cal. Evid. Code §

All relevant evidence is admissible.

Code S 351 (West 1965).

Cal. Evid.

Evidence is relevant when it logically or

naturally tends to prove any disputed material fact; the evidence need
not prove the fact conclusively.

People v. Yu, 143 Cal. App. 3d 358,

376 (1983); People v. Cordova, 97 Cal. App. 3d 665, 669 (1979).

The

relative strength or weakness of the evidence is to be determined by
the jury.

Cordova. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 669.

As with the admission of

expert testimony, wide discretion is left to the trial court in
determining whether evidence is relevant or not.
Cal. App. 2d 642, 676 (1951).

People v. Hess, 104

Expert testimony is relevant and

admissible when offered to rehabilitate and to support the credibility
of the complaining witness, and to disabuse the jury of widely held
misconceptions.
V.

People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 248 (1984); People

Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1099 (1985).
Officer Miller's expert testimony was relevant because it was

offered for these permissible purposes and had a logical tendency to
prove or disprove the disputed material facts of the witnesses'
credibility.

First, his testimony had a reasonable tendency to prove

the credibility of Ms, Manley's testimony.

Her testimony in turn had

a reasonable tendency to prove Stephanie's credibility, which was the
key disputed fact in the case.

On cross-examination of Ms. Manley,

the defendant attacked Ms. Manley's credibility, implying that because
she did not report the incident to the police immediately, she did not
believe that her daughter had been molested and thought her daughter
was lying.

Officer Miller's testimony that many parents delay

reporting an incident of abuse was offered to rehabilitate and support
Ms. Manley's credibility.

Secondly, as discussed above, the evidence
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was also relevant to dispel widely held misconceptions of the average
juror regarding "typical” characteristics of child molesters.

Officer

Miller's testimony that there is no child molester stereotype was
crucial for enabling the jury to evaluate the credibility of the
defendant's testimony (the other key disputed fact in the case) free
from the misconception that child molesters are only aggressive
strangers.
The trial court does have the discretion to exclude an expert's
testimony if:
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of
undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading
the jury.
Cal. Evid. Code § 352 (West 1965).

However, if the trial court

determines that the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect, this
determination should not be overturned unless manifest abuse of
discretion is shown.
(1986) .

People v- Sassounian, 182 Cal. App. 3d 361, 402

In addition, the more substantial the probative value of the

offered evidence, the greater must be the danger that an excluding
factor will be present to support an exercise of the trial court's
discretion excluding the evidence.

|(essler v. Gray/ 77 Cal. App. 3d

284, 291 (1978).
Here, the trial court made an explicit determination that the
probative value of Officer Miller's testimony was not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
discretion.

This ruling was not an abuse of

First, the probative value of Officer Miller's testimony

was high, because it supported the credibility of the key witnesses in
the case, and assisted the jury in understanding the subject of child
17

molestation, which is beyond the jury's common experience.
Furthermore, there are public policy considerations that weigh in
favor of admitting this kind of evidence.

Parents of molested

children should be encouraged to report incidents of child molestation
to the authorities to ensure that child molesters are prosecuted and
to deter other would-be child molesters.

If the courts permit the

testimony of parents who do not immediately report an incident of
abuse to be attacked in court without providing the prosecution an
adequate means of rebuttal, parents will be discouraged from
prosecuting child molestation cases.

To avoid such an undesirable

result, courts should be allowed to freely admit evidence which
rehabilitates the credibility of the parents who do choose to testify.
Second, because Officer Miller's testimony was highly probative,
it must have presented a similarly high danger of unfair prejudice in
order for it to have been properly excluded by the trial court on the
basis of a section 352 objection.

However, the potential prejudicial

effect of the testimony was slight here in comparison with its high
probative value.

Officer Miller did not investigate or have any

knowledge of the specific facts of this case.

His testimony made no

reference to this case, but rather was based on the hundreds of other
child abuse cases he had investigated, the numerous reports and
articles he had studied, and on his discussions with other experts on
the issue.

Thus, cases holding that a significant danger of unfair

prejudice exists when an expert discusses the specific facts of the
case being tried do not apply here.

People y. pjedsoe, 36 Cal. 3d

235, 251 (1984); People v. Roscoe. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 1095 (1985)
In Bledsoe, this court held that expert testimony is not admissible
when offered to prove that the charged offenses had occurred.
18

Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d at 251.

Similarly, in ppscoe, an appellate court

held that it was error to admit a psychologist's expert testimony
which in essence stated that the particular victim should be believed.
Roscoe. 168 Cal. App. 3d at 1095.

However, the Roscoe court also held

that the danger of unfair prejudice was alleviated when the expert
discussed victims as a class.

Id. at 1100.

Here, the expert

testimony was not offered to prove that Ms. Manley should be believed,
or that the defendant had actually molested Stephanie.

Rather, the

testimony was offered to rehabilitate and support Ms. Manley's
credibility and to dispel common misconceptions regarding child
molesters.

In addition, the testimony merely referred to parents of

victims of child molestation and child molesters as a class, and not
to Ms. Manley or the defendant in particular.

Finally, for similar

reasons, there was little danger that Officer Miller's testimony would
be unduly time consuming, would confuse the issues, or would mislead
the jury.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the officer's expert testimony pursuant to Evidence Code
section 352.
II

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY OF THE
DEFENDANT'S CHARACTER WITNESSES REGARDING THE DEFEND;^T S PAST
SEXUAL CONDUCT AND PROPERLY RESTRICTED ^HEIR TESTIMONY TO OPINION
AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE REGARDING HIS CHARACTER FOR HONESTY AND
VERACITY.
The testimony of the defendant's lay character witnesses that the

defendant was not a sexual deviant and did not exhibit lewd conduct on
prior occasions was properly excluded because this testimony was
within the realm of expert testimony.

Furthermore, the character

witnesses' testimony was properly restricted to opinion and reputation
evidence regarding the defendant's character for honesty and veracity.
The excluded testimony was offered as evidence of the defendant's
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character in the form of specific instances conduct to prove that he
did not commit the crime charged, which is prohibited under California
Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1102.

Finally, the proffered

testimony was irrelevant to the material issue whether the defendant
committed the crime charged, and even if slightly relevant, its
probative value was substantially outweighed by its potential
prejudicial effect.
.
The Trial

P'-^r,er1v Excluded Lav Testimony As To Tbe
ge!;„L^Lhavior pLause This Ts ft Subject

Peeerved Evciusivelv For Expert Testimo,ny.
The proffered testimony of the defendant's ordinary character
witnesses that, in their opinion, the defendant was a person who
exhibited "normal sexual behavior" which was not lewd or deviant was
properly excluded by the trial court, because lay persons are not
qualified to testify on the subject of sexual deviance.

It is well

established that only an expert is qualified to testify in the area of
sexual and other psychological disorders.
62 cal. 2d 791, 800-01 (1965)

See, e^,

v.

(a trained psychologist or medical

expert is qualified to testify as to defendant's insanity); and Eepple
V. .Tones. 42 Cal. 2d 219, 225 (1954) (exclusion of testimony of expert
psychiatrist that defendant was not a sexual deviant was error).

A

witness may testify as an expert only if he has special )cnowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as
an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.
code S 720(a)

(West 1965).

Cal. Evid.

An expert's opinion also must be based on

matter perceived or personally known to him of a type that may
reasonably be relied on by an expert in forming an opinion.
Evid. code § 801(b)

(West 1965).

treatises and records,

Cal.

This includes such items as medical

prown v. Colm, 11 Cal. 3d 639, 644 (1974).
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The sufficiency of the showing of a witness* qualifications to testify
as an expert is a natter resting largely within the discretion of the
trial court, and its ruling must not be disturbed on appeal unless
manifest abuse of discretion is shown.

People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d

24, 39 (1976).
The holding in People v. Spiano. 156 Cal. App. 2d 279 (1957),
illustrates these principles.

The defendant in Spigno was also

charged with sexually molesting a nine-year old girl in violation of
Penal Code section 288(a).

The appellate court upheld the trial

court’s exclusion of testimony offered by defendant's witness, a lie
detector technician and qualified psychologist, regarding the
defendant's normal, non-deviant sexual behavior.

Id. at 288-89.

The

court held that the exclusion of the defendant's evidence was proper
because the competency of expert opinion in the field of sexual
psychopathy is limited to persons who have medical and psychological
training, and the defendant's counsel had failed to offer proof that
the witness was qualified to give an expert opinion.

Id.*.

In this case, as in Spiano. the defendant failed to make an offer
of proof as to the character witnesses' qualifications to testify as
experts.

The defendant's witnesses were former girlfriends who would

have based their opinions on their personal interactions with the
defendant.

Far from being persons with knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education sufficient to qualify them as experts on the
subject of sexual deviance, the defendant's proffered witnesses were
individuals with no special training or )cnowledge on this subject
whatsoever.

Further, their opinions were not based on matter that

could reasonably be relied on by an expert witness, such as medical
studies and medical data, but merely on their own personal
21

observations.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in limiting their testimony to opinion and reputation evidence
regarding the defendant's character for honesty and veracity, and as
such the ruling may not be overturned.
The cases cited by the defendant are distinguishable from this
case.

In PennlP v. Stoll. 49 Cal. 3d 1136 (1989), another case

involving violation of Penal Code section 288(a), this court held that
it was prejudicial error to exclude a psychologist's expert opinion
that the defendants were not sexually deviant, because such evidence
is relevant character evidence pursuant to California Evidence Code
section 1102.

Idi at 1152.

The holding in StPll is fully consistent

with the trial court's ruling here, because the issue in that case was
not whether the defense's witness was not qualified to testify as an
expert; rather, the issue was whether the trial court properly
excluded the evidence on the grounds that the proffered testimony
violated special restrictions governing the admission of new or
experimental scientific techniques.

Thus, Stoll's holding is not

contrary to the conclusion that, without an offer of proof of the
witness' expert qualifications, lay opinion testimony regarding the
defendant's sexual deviance is improper and inadmissible.
The other case cited by defendant is also distinguishable from
this case.

in ppr'pIP v. Deletto. 147 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1983), a case

involving prosecution for an act of forcible oral copulation pursuant
to Penal Code section

288

a(c), the appellate court held that the trial

court properly admitted the testimony of the victim's two foster
mothers regarding their observations of the minor's previous aberrant
sexual behavior, without an offer of proof of their expert
qualifications.

at 479.

However, in Deletto, the evidence was
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offered not to show that the defendant committed the acts in question,
but to rebut an inference that one of the foster mothers had
fabricated the entire story.

Deletto, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 479.

In

contrast, in this case, the defense's evidence was not offered to
rebut an inference that Ms. Manley or Stephanie had fabricated the
story; rather, it was offered to prove that the defendant did not
commit the act of molestation on Stephanie.

Therefore, PeleUo does

not support the argument that lay witnesses' opinion testimony that
the defendant has previously exhibited normal sexual behavior is
admissible.
In sum, both statutory and case law support the trial court's
ruling that the testimony of lay persons regarding a defendant's
sexual deviance is inadmissible because it is within the realm of
expert testimony.
B

Assuming That lav Witnesses Are Qualified To Testify^
The Rnb-ier^t Of Sexual Behavior. Testimony Regarding The
C Past Sexual Conduct Was Properly Excluded
i.--- - ,^h.-.-a,~heT Bvidence In The Form Of Specific Instances
nf rnndur-t Ts Inadmissible If Offered To Prove The Defendant
Not Commit The Crime Charged.

Even assuming the defendant's lay witnesses were qualified to
testify on the subject of the defendant's prior "normal sexual
behavior," the trial court properly excluded this evidence and
properly limited the witnesses' testimony to opinion and reputation
evidence of the defendant's character for honesty and veracity, based
on provisions of the California Evidence Code governing admission of
character evidence.

Section 1101(a) provides that:

except as provided...in [section] 1102...evidence of a
person's character or trait of his or her character (whether
in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or
evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is
inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion.
23

Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a) (West Supp. 1990).

Section 1102(a) in turn

provides that:
evidence of the defendant's character or traits of his
character in the form of an opinion or evidence of bis
reputation is not made inadmissible by section 1101 if such
evidence is:
(a) offered by the defendant to prove his conduct in
conformity with such character or trait of his character.
Cal. Evid. Code § 1102(a) (West 1965)

(Emphasis added).

Thus, the

statutes plainly exclude the admission of evidence of a defendant's
character or traits of his character in the form of specific instances
of conduct, when offered to prove that the defendant acted in
conformance with that character or trait on a particular occasion.
See. also. People v. Wagner. 13 Cal. 3d 612, 619 (1975)

(evidence of

specific acts of the accused are, as a general rule, inadmissible to
prove his disposition to commit such acts).
In this case, the defense proffered the testimony of two former
girlfriends that, during the times they had observed the defendant, he
had exhibited "normal sexual behavior" by not acting in a lewd or
deviant manner and by not molesting their daughters.

Because this

testimony related to specific instances of conduct which was offered
to prove:

(1) that the defendant possessed the character of person who

was not a sexual deviant or a child molester; and (2) that he had
acted in conformity with this character on the occasion in question,
this testimony was plainly inadmissible under Evidence Code sections
1101 and 1102.
Furthermore, none of the exceptions to the bar against
admissibility of evidence of a defendant's character in the form of
specific instances of conduct apply here.

First, Evidence Code

section 1101(b) provides that evidence that a person committed an act.
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offered to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or
accident) other than that person's disposition to commit the act, is
admissible.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b)

(West 1965).

However, the

evidence here was not offered to prove any fact other than the
defendant's disposition not to commit an act of child molestation.
Facts such as the defendant's motive, intent, or identity were not at
issue in this case.

The only material issue was whether the defendant

had in fact committed the act in question.

Second, evidence of

specific instances of conduct is also admissible to rebut evidence
introduced by the prosecution that impeaches the defendant's
character.

Law Revision Commission Comment to Evid. Code § 1102.

Here, the prosecutor did not attempt to impeach the defendant's
character, but only introduced evidence contrary to the defendant's
testimony.

It is well established that the introduction of evidence

that simply contradicts the defendant's testimony does not impeach his
character.

people v. Tavlor. 180 Cal. App. 3d 622, 630 (1986).

Thus,

this exception to the bar against admissibility of specific instances
of conduct is also inapplicable.

A final exception to the

inadmissibility of specific acts evidence applies when a defendant's
character is an ultimate fact in dispute, i.e., when character is a
material element of the crime charged, such as in libel or child
custody cases.

Law Revision Commission Comment to Evid. Code § 1100;

In Re Dorothy L. , 162 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1159 (1984).

However, in

this case, the defendant's character was not at issue because it did
not bear on whether he was telling the truth about not committing the
crime charged.

Only the defendant's credibility was in dispute.

The defendant argues, however, that the proffered character
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evidence, rather than being offered to prove that he acted in
conformance with a certain character trait on a specified occasion,
was being offered in support of his credibility.

This court has

recently held that evidence of specific instances of conduct, when
offered in support of a defendant's credibility, is admissible in a
criminal trial as a result of the enactment of section 28(d) of
article I of the California Constitution (the "Right to Truth in
Evidence" provision of Proposition 8).
1047, 1081 (1989).

People v, Harris, 47 Cal. 3d

Section 28(d) effected a "pro tanto repeal" of

California Evidence Code sections 786 and 787, which formerly provided
that evidence of specific instances of conduct offered to attac)c or
support the credibility of a witness was inadmissible.

Although such

evidence is now admissible, it nevertheless must be relevant to a
witness' credibility.
1965).

£ee. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 210 and 350 (West

The test of relevancy in the context of credibility is whether

the evidence will aid the trier of fact in appraising the witness'
credibility and in assessing the probative value of the witness'
testimony.

People v. Serqill. 138 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40 (1982).

Thus,

if a reasonable trier of fact could believe that the evidence would be
sufficient to have a reasonable tendency to prove or disprove the
witness' credibility, then the evidence is relevant and should be
admitted.

Id^

Here, the evidence of specific instances of conduct was not
relevant to the issue of the defendant’s credibility, and was
therefore properly excluded.

No reasonable trier of fact would have

believed that evidence of the defendant past sexual behavior would
have any bearing on the issue of whether he was telling the truth
about not committing the crime charged.
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Evidence that a person acted

in a certain way in the past, with the exception of evidence tending
to show that he told the truth or otherwise acted with integrity, does
not have any tendency in reason to prove or disprove that he is a
credible person.
The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
restricting the character witnesses* testimony to opinion and
reputation evidence, regardless of whether the evidence was offered to
show that the defendant did not commit the act in question, or whether
it was offered in support of his credibility,

C.

The Testimony Of The Defendant*s Past Sexual Behavior Was
ftlso Properly Excluded Because Such Testimony Was
TT-f«=>levant. And Even If Slightly Relevant, The Probative
Value Of The Testimony Was Outweighed Bv Its Prejudicial
Effect.

The trial court also properly excluded testimony regarding the
defendant's prior sexual conduct, and properly restricted the
character witnesses* testimony to opinion and reputation evidence as
to the defendant's character for honesty and veracity, based on
provisions of the California Evidence Code prohibiting the admission
of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.

First, because evidence of

specific instances of the defendant's past sexual conduct and of
character traits other than honesty and veracity did not have a
reasonable tendency to prove or disprove the material issue whether
the defendant was telling the truth about not committing the crime
charged, the evidence was properly excluded as irrelevant under
California Evidence Code section 350.

Secondly, even assuming

arguendo that the excluded testimony possessed some minor probative
value as to whether the defendant committed the crime charged, the
probative value of the offered evidence was substantially outweighed
by the testimony's potential prejudicial effect on the prosecution
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under California Evidence Code section 352.
1

,

yestimonv regarding specific instances of defendant's
past sexual conduct does not meet the fundamental
relevancy reguirements for admissibility.

California Evidence Code section 210 defines "relevant evidence"
as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.

Cal. Evid. Code § 210 (West 1965).

Relevant evidence is also

defined as evidence that tends logically, naturally, or by reasonable
inference to establish a material fact,
3d 358, 376 (1983).

p^opl? y, YU> 143 Cal. App.

California Evidence Code section 350 provides

that "no evidence is admissible except relevant evidence."
Code § 350 (West 1965).

Cal. Evid.

This rule excludes evidence of all collateral

facts or facts that are incapable of affording any reasonable
presumption or inference as to the principal fact or matter in
dispute.

firlotte v. Jessee, 76 Cal. App. 2d 207, 210 (1946).

For

example, evidence of past conduct that occurs an unreasonable period
before the trial may be properly excluded as remote and irrelevant.
V. HicKs. 249 Cal. App. 2d 964, 968 (1967).

Furthermore, in

order for reputation and opinion evidence to be admissible under
Evidence Code section 1102, it must be relevant to the charged
offense.

Pponle V. Qui Mei Lee. 48 Cal. App. 3d 516, 526 (1975).

Wide discretion is left to the trial judge in determining whether
evidence is admissible,

143 Cal. App. 3d at 376, although a trial

judge must give a defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt when
passing on the admissibility of evidence,
3d 576, 584 (1985).

peppi? v. Wright, ^9 Cal.

An evidentiary ruling of the trial court must not

be overturned unless manifest abuse of discretion is shown.
Cal. 3d at 39.
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Eelly, 17

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting
the proffered testimony of the defense's character witnesses to
opinion and reputation evidence because evidence of the defendant's
specific past acts does not satisfy the test for relevancy.

The same

conclusion obtains even upon giving the defendant the benefit of any
reasonable doubt as to the evidence's admissibility.

Testimony that

the defendant exhibited "normal sexual behavior" and did not molest
the daughters of other women the defendant dated briefly in the past
does not have any tendency in reason to prove that the defendant did
not commit the alleged molestation on or about June 9, 1985.

The

defendant may not have molested innumerable other children and yet
still committed the crime charged.

Furthermore, the one former

girlfriend of the defendant who actually testified stated that she had
met the defendant approximately one full year prior to the alleged
molestation, and had only dated him about four or five months.

This

fact alone significantly diminishes the probative value of her
specific acts testimony, since she had not observed the defendant
recently enough or known him long enough to make and accurate
assessment of his conduct.

When this fact is considered in

conjunction with the fact that the specific acts testimony was
collateral to the material issue whether the defendant committed the
crime charged, it is clear that this evidence possessed no probative
value and was irrelevant.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in limiting the character witnesses' testimony to
opinion and reputation evidence.
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in restricting
the character witness' testimony to the specific character traits of
honesty and veracity, and in excluding the offered testimony regarding
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the defendant's character for normal sexual behavior.

The only

material issue of the case was whether the defendant was telling the
truth about not committing the alleged offense; his character for
normal sexual behavior was not at issue.

Therefore, evidence of

character traits other than honesty and veracity was irrelevant and
inadmissible.
2.

Even assuming that the character witnesses* specific
acts testimony possessed some probative value, its
probative value was outweighed bv its potential
prejudicial effect.

California Evidence Code section 352 permits a trial court
to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the probability that its admission will either: (1) necessitate
undue consumption of time; or (2) create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
Evid. Code § 352 (West 1965).

Cal.

As with other evidentiary rulings, wide

discretion is afforded the trial judge in determining whether to
exclude evidence under this section.
App. 3d 361, 402 (1986).

People v. Sassounian, 182 Cal.

Under section 352, the prosecution as well

as the defense is afforded protection from the use of prejudicial
evidence with little probative value.

Wriaht, 39 Cal. 3d at 585.

However, to protect the defendant's constitutional due process rights,
the alleged prejudice to the prosecution cannot be based on mere
speculation or conjecture, and evidence that is relevant to the prime
theory of the defense cannot be excluded simply because the trial
would be simpler without it.

Id.

Nevertheless, this does not imply

that the defendant has a constitutional right to present all relevant
evidence in his favor, no matter how limited in probative value;
rather, the trial court always retains its discretion to exclude
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evidence with only minor probative value pursuant to Evidence Code
section 352.

Peome V. Reeder. 82 Cal. App. 3d 543, 553 (1978).

This court's holding in. Wright, a case involving an appeal from a
first degree murder conviction, is illustrative of these principles,
griabt, 39 cal. 3d 576.

In Wright, the defendant offered evidence, in

support of his defense of self-defense, that the victim had been under
the influence of heroin during an arrest which had occurred two years
prior to the murder.

Isi. at 582.

This court upheld the trial court's

exclusion of the evidence on the grounds that its minor probative
value, due to its remote and collateral nature, was outweighed by its
potential prejudicial effect on the prosecution's case.
cal. 3d at 585.

Hright, 39

A trial court's exclusion of a defendant's character

evidence was similarly upheld on the basis of a section 352 objection
in

V- covino. 100 cal. App. 3d 660, 666 (1980).

In £220110, an

assault and battery case, the trial court excluded evidence of the
victim's aggressive sexual behavior with men other than the defendant
on the grounds that its slight probative value was outweighed by the
possibility that such evidence would confuse the issues and consume an
undue amount of time.
Here, even assuming arguendo that the specific acts evidence
offered by the defendant possessed some slight probative value
regarding the issue whether he in fact committed the crime charged,
the evidence was nevertheless properly excluded by the trial Dudge on
the basis that the evidence's minor probative value was substantially
outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect.

If the character

witnesses had been allowed to testify as to each instance they
Observed the defendant did not act in a lewd or lustful manner, then
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1102, the prosecution would have
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been permitted to rebut this evidence through its own character
witnesses.

See. Law Revision Commission Comment to section 1102.

The

defendant in turn would have been able to respond to this testimony,
and so on.

This would have effectively created a "mini-trial"

resulting in undue time consumption, confusion of the issues, and
misleading of the jury.

This is precisely the reason why evidence of

specific instances of conduct is excluded under Evidence Code section
1102.

See. Law Revision Commission Comment to section 1102.

The fact

that the California Legislature deemed the potential prejudicial
effect of specific acts evidence significant enough to warrant passage
of a rule of evidence barring its admission is sufficient proof that
the potential prejudice to the prosecution in this case was not based
on mere conjecture.

Further, the testimony excluded by the trial

court was not essential to the defendant's defense and did not impair
the defendant's due process rights.

The trial court did not bar the

testimony of the defendant's character witnesses altogether, but
merely restricted their testimony to opinion and reputation evidence
regarding the defendant's character for honesty and veracity.

Since

these were the only character traits relevant to the material issue of
whether the defendant committed the crime charged, the trial court's
ruling did not constitute an abuse of discretion and should be upheld.
III. ASSUMING THE TRIAL COURT DID ERR IN ADMITTING OFFICER MILLER'S
EXPERT TESTIMONY AND IN RESTRICTING THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S
CHARACTER WITNESSES, THESE ERRORS WERE NOT REVERSIBLE PER SE, NOR
DID THEY RESULT IN A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE REQUIRING REVERSAL,
Assuming the trial court did commit an error by: (1) admitting
the expert testimony of Officer Miller; and/or (2) excluding evidence
of prior specific instances of the defendant's conduct and restricting
the character witnesses' testimony to the character traits of honesty
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and veracity, this error does not require reversal of the jury's
verdict, under either the "reversible per se" or the harmless error
standards.
A.

The Alleged Errors Were Not Prejudicial Per Se.

A trial court's error is "prejudicial per se" when the error was
egregious enough to render the trial "fundamentally unfair."
y. Hedaecock, 51 Cal. 3d 395, 410 (1990).

People

Errors have been found to

be "prejudicial per se" in cases where the defendant's confession was
wrongfully introduced, People v. McClarv. 20 Cal. 3d 218, 230 (1977),
the defendant was denied the right to a jury trial, Selby Constructors
MrCarthv, 91 Cal. App. 3d 517, 527 (1979), the case was adjudicated
by a biased judge, People v. Hover, 48 Cal. 3d 247, 279-80 (1989), or
the defendant's fundamental constitutional due process rights were
violated in some other fashion.
This case involved no such egregious violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights.

Neither the admission of Officer Miller's

testimony nor the exclusion of the character witnesses' testimony
resulted in an error egregious enough to be reversible per se.
defendant was not denied a jury trial.
was tried before a biased judge.

The

There was no evidence that he

The defendant was permitted to call

witnesses in his defense and to cross-examine the prosecution's
witnesses.

Minor evidentiary issues of the kind involved in the case

at bar simply do not rise to the level of constitutional error
required to render a trial fundamentally unfair.

Therefore, the trial

court's ruling was not reversible per se, assuming it was error.
B,

The All^^q^d Errors Were Harmless And Did Not Result In A
Miscarriage Of Justice Requiring Reversal Under The Test Of
People V- Watson.

The other standard used in California to determine whether a
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trial court abused its discretion to an extent that requires reversal
of the jury's verdict is the "harmless error" standard enunciated in
p«j>9p1e V. Watson. 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956).

If the defendant had

counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, as the case here,
there is a strong presumption that any errors that may have occurred
are subject to the harmless error analysis,
570, 579 (1986).

pose y. Clark, 478 U.S.

An error is deemed to be harmless unless a

"miscarriage of justice" has occurred.

Watson. 46 Cal. 2d at 836.

A

miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the court, after
an examination of all the evidence, is of the opinion that it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant
would have been reached in the absence of the error.-

For

example, in People v. Deletto, 147 Cal. App. 3d 458 (1983), another
case involving lewd and lascivious acts on a minor, the court held
that although the trial court erred in permitting the minor's foster
mother to testify as to the minor's aberrant behavior, the error was
harmless because this testimony was irrelevant to the issue of the
minor's sexual conduct, and because there was other evidence in
support of the jury's verdict.

at 480.

Therefore, the court held

that it was not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
the defendant would have been reached absent the error.
In this case, assuming the trial court erred in admitting Officer
Miller's testimony and in excluding the specific acts testimony of the
defendant's character witnesses, this error was harmless.

First, it

is not reasonably probable that the exclusion of Officer Miller's
testimony would have resulted in a verdict for the defendant.

If this

court accepts the defendant's argument that the officer's testimony
was erroneously admitted because the officer was not qualified to
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testify as an expert and because his testimony was irrelevant, it
would be inconsistent for it to simultaneously hold that the jury gave
any weight to this irrelevant testimony in their deliberations.
Second, it is not reasonably probable that the admission of evidence
of the defendant's prior conduct would have caused the jury to find
for the defendant, because this evidence was unrelated to the material
issue whether the defendant committed the crime charged.

In addition,

the defendant was still permitted to present other evidence in support
of his defense, in the form of opinion and reputation evidence of his
character for honesty and veracity.

Finally, there was other evidence

that corroborated the complaining witness* testimony and supported the
jury's verdict, such as Ms. Manley's testimony.

Thus, it is not

reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different
conclusion even if the defendant's proffered character evidence had
been admitted.

Therefore, assuming the trial court's rulings were in

error, these errors did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the trial court did not err in the admission of the
expert testimony of Officer Miller that: (a) a parent's delay in
reporting his or her child's statement that the child has been
molested by a person the parent has been dating is not uncommon; and
(b) there is no child molester "profile" or stereotype.

The trial

court also did not err in excluding the testimony of the defendant's
previous girlfriends that he was not a sexual deviant, or in
restricting their testimony to opinion and reputation evidence
regarding the defendant's character for honesty and veracity.
Finally, assuming the trial court did err in the admission and/or
exclusion of evidence, this error did not rise to the level of
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reversible error, under either the "reversible per se" or the
Watson harmless error standard.

Therefore, the People

respectfully request that the trial court's rulings and the
jury's verdict not be disturbed.

Dated:

October 23, 1990
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